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OPERATIONS OF THE 2nd ARMY DURING THE 3rd
PHASE OF THE MEUSE ARGONNE.

COLONEL JAMES V. HEIDT, INFANTRY.

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OPERATIONS OF THE 2nd ARMY DURING THE 3rd PHASE OF THE MEUSE ARGONNE.

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Little more than a year after our declaration of war, that is, by the end of April, 1918, we had succeeded in transporting to France only about 500,000 men. This is an average of less than 40,000 per month. During the following five months the monthly average had increased to about 275,000. At the close of the war we had transported more than 2,000,000 men to the

theatre of war on or near the Western front. (1)

(1) Compiled from
The War with
Germany. Col.
Ayres, Chap. III.

Our organization, training and experience progressed. In August, after the reduction of the Marne Salient, there were ten American Divisions, experienced in battle. The total number of divisions in France had increased until their number was suf-

ficient to constitute several corps. (2)

(2) A.E.F.
Thomas. p. 207.

In natural order, on August 10th, the 1st American Army, composed of the 1st, 4th and 5th Corps, (11 American and 1 French Divisions)

was organized. (3) Its initial operation as such began on Sept.

(3) A.E.F.
Thomas. p. 198.

12th, had as objective the St. Mihiel Salient, on a front of

some twenty-five miles. (4)

(4) Ibid. p. 200.

By October 12th the front occupied by the 1st American Army had, through advances in active operations, been increased to a length of about seventy-five miles. On that date the command was divided into two armies. General Liggett, from the 1st Corps, was assigned to command the 1st Army, and General Bullard from

the 3rd Corps, to command the Second. Both of these Major Generals, one permanent and one temporary, were on October 16th 1918, elevated to the grade of Lieutenant General, temporary. The sector of the 1st Army extended from the Argonne to Fresnes-en-Woevre; that of the 2nd Army from Fresnes-en-Woevre to Port Seille, east of the Moselle, a front of about 32 miles. The front line of the sector assigned to the 2nd Army was held, from right to left, by the 92nd, 7th, 28th and 33rd Divisions, with the 82nd, 35th 4th and 88th Divisions in reserve. (5)

(5)A.E.F.
Thomas.
p.362-363.

These were the combat divisions of the 2nd Army during the 3rd Phase of the Meuse-Argonne. Six of them had experienced service in the Argonne.

Operating under the 2nd Army there were three Corps - the 4th American, General Muir - with the 7th and 28th American Divisions in line; the 6th American, - General Mencher - with 92nd American Division in line; the 17th French - with the 33rd American Division in line. On the left of the 2nd Army was the 81st American Division which was then operating under the 2nd Colonial French Corps, which was, in turn, operating under the 1st American Army. The left of the 2nd Army (33rd Div.) met the right of the 1st Army (81st Div.) at Fresnes-en-Woevre.

The right flank of the 2nd Army (92nd Div.) met, near Port-sur-Seille (about seven miles east of the Moselle,) the

(6) A.E.F.
Thomas.
p. 364.

left flank of the 8th French Army. (6)

By the first week in November the great allied offensive was advancing rapidly from the English Channel to Metz, except in front of Metz itself. The extreme right of the allied attack was at this time in front of Ornes - north of Verdun. Between Ornes and the Moselle, the lines had been for some time rated as quiet. That is, there was no great offensive

(7) Ibid.
p.362.

in progress there at that time. (7) The activities consisted in local advances for the purpose of adjusting the front lines

(8) personal
knowledge
of author.

and raiding parties for identification. (8)

Opposite the 2nd Army the Germans had eleven divisions from right to left, as follows; 3rd Bavarian, 13th Landwehr, 65th and 94th Reserve, 5th, 7th and 124th Landwehr Divisions of Von Gollowitz's Army, and the 31st and 84th Landwehr Brigades of the Army of the Archduke of Wurtemberg. (9)

(9) A.E.F.
Thomas.
p. 364.

The 8th Landwehr Division was also in line near Rembert court opposite the left of the 7th Division. (10)

(10) Personal
Knowledge.

On November 1st an order was issued by the 2nd Army covering the action to be taken in case the enemy retired on the Liege-Metz line. The 17th French Corps, which included the 33rd Division in line, was to advance to Conflans in conjunction with the advance of the 2nd Army in the direction of the Briey Iron Basin. The Fourth Corps, which included the 7th and 28th Divisions in line, was to advance on Vionville. The Sixth Corps,

which included the 92nd Division in line, was to hold the pivot, and maintain liaison with the enemy by means of strong patrols. Preparations were made accordingly.

On November 4th, due to withdrawal of Austro-Hungarian troops, because of the Austrian armistice, Marshal Foch directed that vigorous local operations should be begun to discover the enemy's intention. The Austrian armistice had withdrawn one division from the front of the 2nd Army and it was believed that this would adversely effect the enemy morale. (11)

(11) A.E.F.
Thomas.
p. 364-
365.

While the 1st Army was engaged in constant fighting the 2nd Army, along its entire front, unceasingly harassed the enemy; multiplying its concentrations of fire, organizing raids and soundings in order to fix the enemy and seek to know his intentions. (12)

(12) American
Army in
European
Conflict.
De Cham-
brun.
p.304.

At about this time American planes reported that the enemy wagon trains were seen withdrawing on part of the front of the 2nd Army. Strong patrols varying in strength from a platoon to a battalion, were ordered forward from the divisions in the front lines.

Instructions were given them to gain contact with the supposedly retiring enemy, and they were directed to hold the ground over which they advanced. To facilitate their operation these patrols were equipped with wire and breast reels in order that when their advance was stopped by enemy resistance

which they could not overcome, information could be gotten back to their command in a minimum of time and with a minimum of exposure to hostile fire. On receipt of such information the line reached by the patrol could be built up by infiltration and held until preparations could be made for further advance.

It was soon ascertained by such patrols as penetrated the enemy front lines that there had, at this time, been no withdrawal of the enemy in the front of the 2nd Army.

Several advances were made along the front by moving the front up to the positions of the patrols, but this method proved costly in casualties. It was found that instead of the enemy retirement his position was fully manned, and in

(13) Personal
knowledge.

some cases he threw his reserves into position. (13)

In the meantime our Commander-in-Chief had general plans prepared for the further employment of American forces in an advance between the Meuse and the Moselle, to be directed toward Longwy by the 1st Army, while the 2nd Army was to assume the offensive toward the Briey Iron Basin. Orders directing the preparatory local operations involved in this enterprise were issued on November 5th. (14)

(14) Final Report, Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F.
p. 52.

The preparatory local operations above referred to, among other things, directed the 1st Army to push its offensive north to the Meuse, and also to clear the right bank so

that the 1st and 2nd Armies could move abreast to their goal. Meanwhile orders were given to the 2nd Army which led to the selection of one brigade from the 7th Division and one brigade from the 28th Division to move through the hilly country on both sides of the Rupt-de-Mad in the direction of Chambley, with the limited objectives of the Michael Stellung and the eastern edge of the Bois de Grand Fontaine. This attack was originally planned for the 11th of November, but as it was reported that the German retirement had at this time become so rapid along all fronts, the date was ordered ahead to the 10th, and a greater front was covered than was at first contemplated..

On the 9th the 81st Division of the 1st Army attacked on a front of about 11 miles from Eix to Fresnes, and took the fortified village of Moranville. It also broke through the 1st and 2nd entrenched lines to the east of the village and took the woods behind the 2nd line. This greatly helped the left of the Second American Army in its attack the next morning, and in reality forms more a part of the attack of the 2nd Army than of the 1st.

On the morning of the 10th of November the 81st Division took Grimancourt and by 11:00 A.M. reached Abaucourt, on the Verdun-Stain railroad and began the assault of the German main line of resistance. In accordance with the plan, the 33rd Division (2nd Army) attacked that morning on the right of the

81st Division towards Conflans. The 33rd carried all of the defenses from Saulx-en-Woevre to Marchville inclusive, after bitter resistance. It was thrown out of this village and the Bois-de-Harville by strong counter attacks. (15)

(15) A.E.F.
Thomas.
p.365-366.

On the next morning, November 11th, the assault was resumed, 2 regiments in the assault echelon, attacking the enemy main line of resistance at Butgneville. This attack was smashing through the enemy lines when it was halted by the armistice. During these two days' operations the 33rd Division had a total of 614 casualties. (16)

(16) A.E.F.
Thomas.
p. 367-368.

The 28th Division, on the right of the 33rd Division, assaulted on the 10th and advanced to the Bois de Dommartin, encountering heavy resistance. Its second assault that afternoon, after artillery preparation, failed, and the line still rested for the night in front of these woods. On the 11th the assault was resumed. The Division had passed through the outer zone of German defenses and was in the midst of the assault on the main line in front of the Bois de Bonseil, when stopped by the armistice. (17)

(17) A.E.F.
Thomas.
p.366-368.

The 7th Division adjoining the right of the 28th Division, commenced, on November 9th, local preliminary offensive operations for the purpose of straightening its line and getting into position to facilitate its jump off on assuming the pending general advance, as well as sounding the enemy and getting

identifications. On the 9th its left element advanced as far as Mt. Plaisir Ferme, and took Hill 323 on the Rembercourt Spur. At the Ferme it was held up by enemy rifle, machine gun, and Artillery fire from strong opposing forces established in well wired positions.

Three separate batches of prisoners captured from two regiments of the 8th Landwehr Division confirmed the presence, in normal order of battle, of that Division. On the morning of the 9th, the right element sent forward two patrols, each consisting of a squad. They came under enemy fire during their advance up Preny Ridge. These patrols were backed up

~~(18) Forwarded by two larger patrols. (18)~~
knowledge.

As our air service reported that the roads to the enemy's rear were crowded with retreating troops, these patrols were ordered to gain contact with, pursue the enemy, and hold the ground gained. The remainder of the Battalion advanced to the Hindenburg trenches on Preny Ridge where it met strong resistance and later, due to intense enemy Machine Gun and Artillery fire was forced to withdraw with considerable casualties, and returned to original lines.

Preny was within the range of the heavy guns of Metz and its right flank was exposed. The enemy artillery concentration possible to be brought on this part of the line was terrific. The position was particularly strong and difficult.

Referring to the above mentioned activities the Operations Report (#39) 7th Division, November 10th states - "At 7 hours the provisions of Field Order No. 10, these headquarters, went into effect. The 13th Brigade attacked along the entire divisional front, with two regiments in line, - 56th on the right and 55th on the left, with elements of 14th Brigade in support."

On the 10th the 34th Infantry assaulted and took a stone quarry in the hills near Rembercourt and advanced to the outskirts of Charey where it came upon dense wire belts.

At 2:00 A.M. November 11th orders were issued for the 13th Brigade to attack, penetrate the enemy line, and continue the advance. A copy of the order and plan are hereto attached.

(Exhibit "A".) H hour for this attack was set at 2:00 P.M. 11th November. The armistice prevented its being put into execution.

The 92nd Division was in the front line astride of the Moselle. Its left regiment in line joined the right of the 7th Division, and the right of this regiment rested on the west bank of the Moselle. This element of the 92nd Division made no advance. The front line here was several miles in advance of the front line east of the Moselle.

That Brigade of the 92nd Division whose left rested on the east bank of the Moselle did advance about three miles behind a rolling barrage and occupied the Bois Frehaut, near

the river, the Bois Voivrette and the Bois de Cheminot further east. The assault echelon of the 366th Infantry withdrew to the south of the Bois de Voivrette during the afternoon when the enemy drenched the Bois with gas, but these woods were retaken and passed to the north of by the same regiment about midnight. The 92nd Division was on the right of the 2nd Army. This division was joined on its right by the French who did not advance, as this was to be a turning movement until the

direction had become almost due east. (19)

(19) Statement
of Brigade
Cmdr. Brig.
Gen. Barnum.

In these two days' battle, the 2nd Army found the Germans making a determined stand with all the force left at their command, but the progress made gave evidence of what two more days would have developed, and with more and more American divisions coming up in reserve, the success of the break through was assured. As it was, the 2nd Army wrested from the enemy about 55 square miles, at a total cost of 1380 casualties, which was just slightly more than the cost of taking of Cantigny, when the Americans began their offensive action. (20)

(20) A.E.F.
p. 369.

Had the armistice come a few days later the accomplishments of this 2nd Army, which had been organized less than a month, would have been far greater. Its prepared and approved plans involved not only the far reaching consequences of its offensive throughout its entire front in the direction of the Briey Iron Basin, but also, in conjunction with this offensive,

(21) Personal observation. another was to be initiated on November 14th. (21)

In the final report of the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces he states:

"At 9:00 P.M. on November 9th appropriate orders were sent to the First and Second Armies in accordance with the following telegram from Marshal Foch to the Commander of each of the Allies Armies - 'The enemy, disorganized by our repeated attacks retreats along the entire front. It is important to coordinate and expedite our movements. I appeal to the energy and the initiative of the Commanders-in-Chief of their armies to make decisive the results obtained.' In consequence of the foregoing instructions, our Second Army pressed the enemy along its entire front", also as follows -

"Operations of the Second Army. Under instructions issued by me on November 5th, for operations by the Second Army in the direction of the Briey Iron Basin, the advance was undertaken along the entire front of the army and continued during the last three days of hostilities. In the face of stiff resistance offered by the enemy, and the limited number of troops at the disposal of the Second Army, the gains reflect great credit on the divisions concerned. On November 6th, Marshal Foch requested that six American divisions be held in readiness to assist in an attack which the French were preparing to launch in the direction of Chateau-Salins. The plan was

agreed to, but with the provision that our troops should be employed under the direction of the commanding general Second Army. The combined attack was to be launched on November 14th and was to consist of 20 French divisions under General Mangin and six American divisions under General Bullard. Of the divisions designated for this operation the Third, Fourth, Twenty-ninth and Thirty-sixth were in Army reserve, and were starting their march, eastward on the morning of November 11th, while the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-fifth were being withdrawn

(22) Final Re-
port Cmr.
in Chief

from the line on the Second Army front." (22)

In this connection the following quoted memorandum for

A.E.F.

p.52-53.

G-3 A.E.F. and extracts from his report are pertinent and
of interest;--

(COPY)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
Third Section G.S.

October 28, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

SUBJECT: Preliminary Note on an Offensive.

I have just returned from Headquarters VIII French Army where I have been studying an offensive between the Moselle and the Vosges.

I submit this as a preliminary note on the subject for your information, a further written study on the subject to be submitted.

Difficulties of an Operation.

Certain difficulties are presented which have to be considered but which are not insurmountable.

(a) The moral effect of the region of Metz. This has been allowed to have too great an effect on operations. The defenses, like all works, are dependent on their garrison for their real strength. The reserves which may rest in the vicinity are of more vital importance than the works. This, however, will be studied further.

(b) The Seille and the Loure Rivers which parallel the front. These are serious obstacles because of bad marshy places, and possibility of flooding by storm and artificially. Except in very bad weather (winter and early spring) these obstacles could be overcome. A crossing cannot be made at will throughout the front. A very complete study on these rivers is now on hand, having just been completed by the 32nd A.C. (French).

(c) The Cote de Belme. This ridge appears to be the main defense next south of Metz and is dependent for its power on a smooth glacis for a foreground and excellent observation. But on clear days excellent ground observation can be had from our lines from a ridge which would furnish considerable protection from view of our own guns at a range of 14,000 meters. Places for railroad guns bearing on this ridge are also available and even without accompanying artillery the heavy guns should enable its capture.

✓ of
(d) Rough ground and woods near Chateau Salins would enable the enemy to slow up an attack. The works there, however, would be of little avail if lightly held.

(e) The Lake Region between Dieuze and Saarbourg. This presents difficulties to a rapid movement, but the region can be carried particularly as the lines in front should be carried rapidly.

Favorable Opportunities and conditions.

(a) Between the Cote de Delme and Metz defenses, the enemy's prepared lines are notably weak and present a possibility of easy rupture from which he could recover only with difficulty.

(b) Between the Lake Region and the Vosges a comparatively smaller surprise attack on Saarbourg has considerable prospect of success and discomfiture to the enemy.

(c) The rail and road communications of this front are excellent and will materially aid in surprise and continuing operations.

(d) Billeting capacity for operations late in the season ~~is~~ good.

(e) A surprise attack against the Cote de Delme and area north of it would be assisted by a great deal of cover in our back areas. Also by the fact that Divisions have been moving in and out of the region of Toul for a considerable period, and when there, are not far from the required location.

(f) The enemy occupies this region by one division per ten kilometers, the smallest garrison of the entire line.

An offensive to break through just south of Metz defenses including the capture of the Cote de Delme has some risks in case of failure and has large prospects in results in case of a brilliant operation.

I recommend that a further detailed plan be made for the operation mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

If it is desired that a different plan be prepared first, please indicate, or shall I submit outlines of other plans for approval.

REPORT
of
THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
THIRD SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
G.H.Q.A.E.F.

* * * * *

Seeing the early completion of the operations then in progress, the Commander-in-Chief, on November 5th, issued instructions for future operations as indicated in the following extracts from a letter signed by himself;

"2. The First and Second Armies will at once prepare to undertake operations with the ultimate purpose of destroying the enemy's organization and driving him beyond the existing frontier in the region of BRIEY and LONGWY.

"3. As preliminaries of this offensive, the First Army will;

"a) Complete the occupation of the region between the MEUSE and the BAR.

~~"b) Complete the present operation of driving the enemy from the heights of the MEUSE north of VERDON and south of the FORET DE WOEVRÉ.~~

"c) Conduct an offensive with the object of driving the enemy beyond the THEINTE and CHIERS.

"The operation ordered in "c) will be begun at once by establishing a footing on the east bank of the MEUSE in the region of STENAY-BOUZON.

"4. The Second Army will;

"a) Conduct raids and local operations in accordance with verbal instructions already given.

"b) Advance its line between the MOSELLE and the ETANG LACHAUSSEE toward GORZE and CHAMBLEY.

"c) Prepare plans for an attack in the direction of BRIEY along the axis FRESNES--CONFLANS--BRIEY.

"In submitting plans under "c), recommendations will be made as to the necessary extension of the present Second Army Front toward the northwest."

REPORT
of
THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
THIRD SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
G. H. Q. A. E. F.

* * * *

The prospect, which became more and more of a certainty, of forcing an early conclusion of the war made it essential to keep all troops in line to the utmost limit of their powers of endurance, and forbade the rest to which the tired divisions were richly entitled. Divisions which could no longer remain in the active battle front were, therefore, often sent to the calmer sector of the Second Army. The spirit in which the Headquarters of the Second Army accepted what, by comparison, was a secondary role, and the ability and activity of the Second Army Staff, are worthy of all commendation. This spirit, ability and activity were destined to reap their reward by a great success when all offensive movements were stopped by the Armistice on November 11th.

The Commander-in-Chief's order of November 5th, under which the Second Army was preparing for an offensive toward Briey, was mentioned on page 85.

On the same day (November 5th) that the Commander-in-Chief wrote Second Armies, Marshal Foch dated a letter in which he asked that six American divisions be held in readiness to assist in an attack which the French were preparing in the region of Chateau-Salins. Such an operation had long been favored by the Commander-in-Chief, and in fact had been studied by General Headquarters as early as September 1917. Upon receipt, on November 6th, of Marshal Foch's letter the Commander-in-Chief, therefore, at once concurred in the general idea and directed that arrangements be made to secure the necessary number of divisions. The 3rd, 4th, 28th, 29th, 35th, and 36th Divisions were designated, and the Commander-in-Chief planned that they should be employed under the Second Army Staff. At first the French desired that these divisions be placed as divisions at the disposition of General Mangin who was charged, under General de Castlenau, with the conduct of the French attack. The Commander-in-Chief insisted that these divisions be not dispersed, and on November 10th sent a staff officer to the Headquarters of General de Castlenau, General Mangin, and of the Second Army to make arrangements accordingly. The result of this visit was an agreement that the 6 divisions were to be employed on the right of the Second Army, that the Commanding General Second Army was to cover the left of the French attack and that, to insure this, he should conform to the wishes of General Mangin.

The movement of the six divisions was under way, the French having tentatively scheduled the attack for November 14th, when it was stopped by the signing of the Armistice.

ANALYSIS.

The 2nd Army's operation north of Metz would have there driven a wedge into the German line. At the same time its operation to the south in the direction of Chateau-Salins, in conjunction with General Mangin's French Force, would have there driven a wedge into the German lines, thus isolating the fortress.

To combat these attacks there could be only the enemy troops already in that area and there were no reserves to be had as the cutting of the Sedan railroad had practically cut the German army in two. The greater part was north of Sedan. To reach Lorraine they could have come around through Belgium. Also as the allied line grew shorter troops thus released together with ^{those} already there would have thrown an overwhelming force against the enemy on that front. ~~The existence of the German army from this threatened~~

catastrophe which promised to be more rapid and more complete than any disaster they had yet suffered.

LESSONS.

Due to the Armistice the active life of the 2nd Army was less than one month. Within that time it was conducting operations along a front of some thirty-two miles and had four divisions in the front line. While its divisions were complete prior to the organization of the 2nd Army, and its rear was in territory well organized in the service of supply, and though many of its troop units were still not assigned, this army was prepared in its plans for offensive operation and actually did assume offensive activities along its entire front in little more than three weeks after the issue of the order for its organization. The rapidity of the organization of its staff and the quick smoothness of operation of the staff are noteworthy accomplishments which afford a valuable lesson.

EXHIBIT "A".

HEADQUARTERS 13TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

2 H.

November 11, 1918.

Field Order)
)
No. 4)

Maps: Plans Directeurs , 1:20,000.

1. In our immediate front the enemy holds the line North slope of PRENY ridge - trench system and pill-box area extending west therefrom (See map.) It is believed he intends to withdraw but may continue to hold the line with diminished force. Troops on right and left of 13th Brigade will continue today to press the enemy with strong patrols.

2. At H hour today the 13th Brigade will attack the enemy and gain the objective as shown on tracing herewith. This piercing of the hostile main line will be exploited in order to widen the breach and take up pursuit or continue the attack as circumstances develop.

3. (a) The 56th Infantry will attack with two battalions, each in a zone of action as shown on tracing herewith. The C.O. 56th Infantry with his ~~reserve~~ ~~at his disposal~~ will assume command of the left and centre zones of action. Having gained the objective, ~~and having controlled~~ beyond it, (See par) he will seize the opportunity, if it presents itself, to widen and deepen the penetration by passing the reserve battalion through his front to the crest 1 kilometer north of FME de la GRANGE en NAIE. The left battalion will follow this progression closely by advancing to and penetrating BOIS de VILLECEY, BOIS BRULE and BOIS des CREVAUX, taking in flank the enemy on ridge east of REMBER COURT. The right battalion of the 56th Infantry will similarly advance to the vicinity of the road and ravine extending north from 370.8 - 244.6.

(b) The 3rd Bn., 64th Infantry, will attack in the zone of action as shown on tracing herewith. At daylight November 11th, or as soon thereafter as this order is received, the battalion will be assembled in a suitable place to prepare for the attack, leaving a skeleton of small posts along the front of its normal sector. After having gained its objective in the attack, the patrols sent by it to establish outpost and reconnoiter will be of suitable size and suitably equipped to close up the PRENY Ridge defensive works east of the battalion objective as far as may be necessary or practicable.

(c) Outpost and patrolling. Under protection of the rolling barrage, after its 30 minute halt covering the objective, strong patrols will be sent as follows: By the 56th Inf., to BOIS de VILLECEY, FME de la GRANGE

on RAIE and FME SEBASTOPOL. By the 3rd Bn. 64th Infantry in trenches on Preny Ridge, east of the objective. The barrage will halt 15 minutes to cover the establishment of these posts and the organization of smaller patrols to reconnoiter as follows: after the barrage lifts: By 56th Infantry to the line BOIS BRUIE, BOIS de CHEVAUX, FME de CHENOIS and east of FME SEBASTOPAL. By 3rd Bn., 64th Infantry, to Hill 262.2 and towards Preny.

(d) Artillery. From H - 20 to H, bombardment of enemy positions; to continue after H hour lifted off successively as proximity of attacking troops necessitates cessation of fire. At H hour a rolling barrage will be laid down. After firing 10 minutes on the initial line, the barrage will roll at the rate of 100 meters in 8 minutes until it reaches a line covering the objective. Here it will halt 30 minutes. It will then roll at the rate of 100 meters in 4 minutes until it reaches a line covering the main elements of the outpost. Here it will halt 15 minutes and then lift off. The last halting line of the barrage will be the S.O.S. barrage line until other arrangements are made.

(e) Reserve. The 55th Infantry (less 1 Bn. in divisional reserve) will constitute the brigade reserve. The reserve will be equipped and ready to pass through the 56th Infantry to pursue, or to extend the breach in the enemy's line. One battalion in woods west and south of CABANE FORESTIERE (east of Vieville). One battalion will be held in readiness during the day (Nov. 11th) and will proceed to positions assigned above promptly on receipt of notice of H hour, unless otherwise ordered.

(f) Designated posts of the attacking battalions, not in first wave, will clean up the ground covered. It is of the highest importance that all dugouts and pill-boxes be cleaned up thoroughly, by dropping bombs in them and by other means.

4. Supplies, communications and evacuation covered by divisional order.

5. Divisional liaison plan November 1, 1918, applies

13th Brigade, advanced P.O.	369.2 - 241.2
56th Infantry " "	369.6 - 242.1
3rd Bn.(64th Inf.)" "	371.0 - 242.4

14th
3rd x 13th
B429
Boundary

